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Abstract My argument is that poststructuralist and postmodernist theory
carries on and intensifies the main lines of a characteristically modern
tradition of aesthetics whose most important point of reference is not
French structuralism – as the term, ‘poststructuralism’, implies – but the
tradition of 18th-century German romanticism and idealism that culmi-
nated in the work of Heidegger during the Weimar period in Germany
between the world wars and afterward. What characterizes this modernist
tradition of aesthetics is its valorization of language as a mode of being
possessed of an ‘ontological’ status. I place the term ‘ontology’ in quotes in
order to highlight the distinction between ‘metaphysics’, with its Aris-
totelian and neo-Platonic connotations of a ‘chain of being’, and the more
modern term ‘ontology’, which was coined in the 17th century and which
became widely used during the 18th century by Leibnizian philosophers
Christian Wolff and Alexander Baumgarten; the latter, not incidentally, also
helped to establish modern usage of the term ‘aesthetics’.
‘Metaphysics’ and ‘ontology’ have their roots, respectively, in those two
most major currents of our western heritage, the Graeco-Roman and
Judaeo-Christian. These currents, although inextricably linked to one
another in innumerable ways, have nonetheless been engaged, as Nietzsche
put it, ‘in a fearful struggle on earth for thousands of years’ that has been
obscured by Heidegger’s and Derrida’s accounts of the history of western
philosophy. Such accounts have projected what is basically a romanticist
critique of Enlightenment values and thought on to a totalizing account of
the history of Western thought since Plato. My purpose in emphasizing the
distinction between metaphysics and ontology is to provide a conceptual
framework within which our understanding of the development of modern
aesthetics, and the concept of language that informed that development, can
be related to the larger philosophical issues at hand. Literary theorists in
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the United States, by endorsing Heidegger’s and Derrida’s self-serving
accounts of their writings as assaults on the entire history of Western philo-
sophy, and by failing to judge them critically as outgrowths of that history,
have not only obscured these developments. They have also sustained the
central tenet of American literary theory since the 1960s: that there is such
a thing as a ‘Western philosophical tradition’ on the ‘other’ side of which,
through an endless series of linguistic coinages and ‘erasures’, we may
maneuver ourselves. My claim is that to the extent that there is such an other
side, we are already on it, and that we fundamentally misunderstand our
situation if we regard it as ‘other’ to the Western philosophical tradition.
Key words Derrida · Heidegger · language · ontology · theory 
I
One of the remarkable features of the development of American literary
theory since the 1960s has been its displacement of the term ‘philo-
sophy’ by the term ‘theory’. The sources of that displacement can be
traced to the work of the thinker who, more than any other, shaped
American literary theory during the period: Jacques Derrida.1 Only by
distinguishing ‘theory’ from ‘philosophy’ – especially, as Derrida said,
‘the history of philosophy’ – could the epistemological stranglehold
effected by the latter be broken.2 This distinction was taken, by
American literary theorists, quite in the spirit it was given: as offering
a way of ‘theorizing’ that would rise above and expose the futility of
any merely ‘philosophical’ tradition, especially if that tradition were
Anglo-American and analytic. New Critics, in contrast, had viewed
literary theory as a province of aesthetics, which was, in turn, follow-
ing the standard Kantian division, one of the three main subject-matters
of philosophy, epistemology and ethics being the other two.3
To free theory from philosophy, however, literary theorists needed
to break from the philosophical tradition of aesthetics and what they
regarded as its ‘meaning-oriented’, epistemological basis. That break
came to be signified by the term ‘poststructuralism’. That the term was
of American coinage and did not have a French equivalent or counter-
part was crucial to the power it wielded. It was crucial because it
allowed American critics to reference their theoretical orientation to a
‘foreign’ source, or tradition, which was largely of their own invention.
For in France there was no distinct movement which came ‘after’ struc-
turalism and which was regarded as its successor – even though, of
course, there was a second generation of structuralists in the 1960s
which radicalized the anti-humanistic orientation of the first generation.
By the mid-1980s, moreover, many of the leaders of the second gener-
ation, including Barthes, Althusser, and Foucault, as well as Phillippe
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Sollers’s influential journal Tel Quel, had disappeared from the scene
and Derrida’s influence in France, never very great to begin with, had
waned. What came ‘after’ structuralism came not in France but in the
United States where, however, there was no ‘before’, relative to post-
structuralism, since structuralism was never well established enough
here to justify speaking of it as being superseded. Structuralism, in sum,
became influential in the United States only as poststructuralism, in
which guise it could appear to be exactly what it was not in France: an
anti-formalistic approach to literary study that encouraged political
engagement.4
In this essay, I argue that the most important sources of contem-
porary American literary theory are neither the linguistics-based
movement of French structuralism, as the term ‘poststructuralism’
implies, nor a ‘modernity’ that has been superseded, as the term ‘post-
modernism’ implies, but rather a modernist tradition of aesthetics
shaped by 18th- and early 19th-century German Romanticism and
idealism, movements that culminated in the work of Heidegger during
the Weimar period between the world wars and afterward, exercising
an increasingly dominant influence on French theorists after the Second
World War, from Sartre through Derrida, and subsequently on the
development of poststructuralism and postmodernism during the 1970s
and 1980s in this country.
That deconstruction shares much in common with Romanticism is
hardly an original observation.5 Nonetheless, the observation, when
made, is not usually intended to apply to deconstruction’s semiotic
account of language as a system of arbitrary signs without positive
values. For the latter account denies what Romanticism is often assumed
to maintain: that the meaning of our language signs is grounded in some
extra-linguistic, usually organicist ‘presence’ to which the signs refer.
My contention, by contrast, is that Romanticist, especially German
influences, operating in complementary relation with influences from the
English and French Enlightenments, provided the cultural and concep-
tual milieu in which literary theory’s ‘ontological’, but intensely anti-
metaphysical, view of language took root and grew. Far from militating
against such a process, semiotics formed one of its more crucial com-
ponents. In what follows, I explore what is at issue for literary theory
in this process, beginning with an historical overview of the French and
German sources of American literary theory.
II
The movement of French structuralism out of which American post-
structuralism is supposed to have developed arose in the 1950s as a
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radical new method of sociological analysis that drew inspiration from
the hard sciences, was modeled on Saussurean linguistics as shaped by
Roman Jakobson and Claude Lévi-Strauss, and gained its greatest
support in the areas of anthropology, psychoanalysis, and literary criti-
cism. What was radical about the method was not just its overwhelm-
ing emphasis on language as the key to understanding thought and
behavior in all areas, but its anti-humanistic, largely de-historicized
conception of language as an arbitrary system of signs which operated
independently of the control of an intentionalist subject, especially if
that subject were an author. Such language-based anti-humanism not
only challenged the Sartrean existentialism that had dominated Parisian
intellectual culture since the Second World War, but was also a threat,
within the French university system, to the methods and assumptions of
the older, highly respected academic disciplines of philosophy and
history, which until this time had successfully resisted, Durkheimian
sociology notwithstanding, the incursions of the ‘upstart’ social sciences.
In sharp contrast to poststructuralism in the United States, structural-
ism was a movement launched and sustained outside the privileged
centers of the academy; not until the mid-1960s – Lévi-Strauss’s first
book was published in 1949 – did it become firmly entrenched within
French academic life.6
Although many of the early structuralists were Hegelians and
Marxists, the political orientation of the movement was far from
‘radical’ by French standards. On the contrary, one of its principal
targets was the ethic of political and personal ‘engagement’ espoused by
Sartre, whose thought and influence were attacked in the harshest and
most uncompromising terms by much of the French structuralist
movement, from Lévi-Strauss to Althusser, Foucault, Derrida, and
Lyotard; only Roland Barthes, among major figures in the movement,
spoke appreciatively of Sartre’s work. When the student-led rebellion of
May 1968 exploded, it took most structuralists by surprise, received
little support from them with the exception of Foucault, and as a con-
sequence earned the resentment of many of the students. Sartre, by
contrast, dramatically championed their cause.7
During the 1960s, the leadership of the structuralist movement
shifted to a younger generation of theorists led by Foucault, Barthes,
Lacan, and Althusser. This generation escalated structuralism’s anti-
pathy to traditional philosophy, including Sartrean humanism, and
shifted the register of its scientistic ambitions to a more recondite, philo-
sophical and literary key. Most of the generation saw themselves less as
breaking with structuralism than as developing and radicalizing its
original goals. It is true that beginning in the late 1960s, many members
of this generation, Derrida and Foucault included, sharply criticized
earlier forms of structuralism, which were associated more than any
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other single figure with Lévi-Strauss, whose work Derrida critiqued in
his first lecture in the United States in 1966. But it is also true that the
younger generation, Derrida and Foucault included, had closely
identified themselves with structuralism prior to this time. The concep-
tion of language that informed their work was indeed quite consistent
with that of the older generation. Lévi-Strauss, arguing against Sartre,
had contended that ‘the dichotomous approach [used in semiotics] is in
no way incompatible with dialectical thought, but clearly the contrary’,8
and most second-generation structuralists followed suit. Both privileged
language, or more generally signs, as autonomous systems whose
workings could be described in terms of a logic of difference, and whose
basis was the analytical tool of Saussurean binary opposition developed
by Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss in the 1940s and 1950s.9
French ‘poststructuralism’, then, was viewed in France as at most a
kind of ‘hyper-structuralism’ or ‘neo-structuralism’, as Manfred Frank
has termed it,10 that was continuous with, even if diverging in signifi-
cant ways from, the original structuralism of Jakobson, and Lévi-Strauss
as influenced by the work of Saussure. If there was a significant and
consistently maintained change in theoretical orientation from the first
to the second generation of structuralists in France, it is best character-
ized less as a break or rupture from classical to modern philosophical
conceptions than as a gradual change or transition within characteris-
tically modern perspectives: from Hegelian, as well as Husserlian and
early Heideggerian perspectives, to a late Heideggerian one.11
The influence of Hegelian dialectics and Husserlian phenomenology
on 20th-century French thought can hardly be overestimated.12 French
philosophy during the 19th century had been dominated by neo-
Kantianism, which arose in Germany in the 1830s and 1840s as a ‘back
to Kant’, anti-Hegelian movement that attempted to restore the bound-
aries between the sciences and the humanities, Naturwissenschaften and
Geisteswissenschaften, and which in the process granted epistemological
priority to the former. By the 1890s in France and elsewhere, a strong
reaction against such positivistic currents had set in.13 But that reaction,
fueled by the Dreyfus affair, drawing on Marx more as a moral auth-
ority than as a dialectician, and appealing to the Romanticist intuition-
ism of Henri Bergson, was anything but Hegelian in substance or spirit.
As Mark Poster showed, only in the wake of the disillusionment after
the First World War, during the 1920s and 1930s, did Hegelian and
Marxist historicism become a major force in French intellectual life
(which was exactly the period in Germany, we will see in a moment,
when disillusionment with historical grand narratives reached crisis pro-
portions). The appeal of both Hegelian dialectics and Husserlian
phenomenology was that they seemed to offer methods and strategies
to challenge and critique neo-Kantian and Enlightenment rationalism,
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and to do so in a way that had both philosophical and political ramifi-
cations. As Judith Butler said, referring to the sense of defeat and dis-
illusion that characterized post-war France: 
The Phenomenology’s vision of an active and creating subjectivity, a journey-
ing subject empowered by the work of negation, served as a source of hope
during these years of political and personal crisis. The ontological principle
of negation made itself known historically during these times as a principle
of destruction, and yet Hegel’s Phenomenology provided a way to under-
stand negation as a creative principle as well. The negative is also human
freedom, human desire, the possibility to create anew; the nothing to which
human life had been consigned was thus at once the possibility of its
renewal.14
It was in the work of the second generation of structuralists that
such possibilities of nothingness took on new and energetic form. For
such thinkers, who generally assumed as their point of departure
Heidegger’s 1947 critique of Sartrean humanism, as well as his lectures
on Nietzsche’s The Will to Power, it was the anti-rationalist, ontologi-
cally subversive implications of language which were most important.
As Vincent Descombes described this process, ‘It was necessary to
abandon the concept in order to state the definitive issue – existence or
non-existence, being or non-being’.15 Crucial in promoting such a turn
away from epistemology to ontology were the seminars of Heideggerian-
influenced Hegelian philosophers Alexander Kojève and Jean Hyppolite.16
These seminars provided occasions for the presentation of important
early writings of Lacan, Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida. Applying the
tools of Saussurean linguistics to Hegelian and Heideggerian thought,
but rejecting the rationalist basis on which Saussure, influenced by 18th-
century thought, had contrived those tools, these thinkers attacked the
anthropomorphically driven presumption of language mastery which,
they averred, had characterized the western philosophical tradition from
its beginnings in ancient Greece. As Gilles Deleuze said, ‘Philosophy must
be ontology, it cannot be anything else; but there is no ontology of
essence [i.e. classical ontology or metaphysics], there is only an ontology
of sense’.17 By ‘ontology of sense’, Deleuze meant what Foucault, Barthes,
and Derrida all referred to in different ways as the ontological, but
determinedly anti-metaphysical, effort to think ‘the being’ of language.
And to think the being of language was at the same time, as the Tel Quel
group, influenced by the symbolist, surrealist, and dadaist movements,
emphasized, to think of language as a performative medium which
exemplified what was most crucial to the aesthetic experience. In this
way an understanding of the logic of language as the product of arbi-
trary processes was joined to the aestheticist bestowal on language of a
‘being’ that is at the same time a ‘nothingness’ – a being of nothingness,
a presencing of absence. As Descombes put it:
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In the portion of the world labelled ‘History’, negativity rules. Or, if we
prefer, difference. If nothing is not being, and if ‘to be’ and ‘to be identi-
cal with oneself’ are identical, then nothingness is never identical with
anything – never, nowhere, and in no case. But if nothingness has no
identity, if it is only defined by difference, then nothingness must be said
to be different from itself, there is a certain being in not-being.18
Eighteenth-century skepticism, which had questioned our direct
access to reality on the basis of our dependence on the flawed instru-
ments, especially language, by which such access could presumably be
gained, thus installed itself as a key component of a 20th-century affir-
mation: that language, viewed now as the more or less exclusive basis
of our access to reality, constituted a defining element of our being.
Skepticism about the referential and representational properties of
language silently merged with the assertion of language’s autonomous
character: its status as a form of being that rises above, or ‘cancels and
preserves’ (aufgehoben), any merely ‘human’, sensuously grounded,
social and historical form of experience.19
But what was, at least in the initial stages of French structuralism,
a more or less ‘stifled’ current of opposition to Enlightenment rational-
ism had long before taken on, within the German tradition, the pro-
portions of a raging flood. Although German intellectuals had always
been lacking, relative to the French, in political avenues of expression,
they had usually made up for such a lack by endowing less public and
political forms such as literature and philosophy with culturally oppo-
sitional and nationalistic energies. During the 1890s, the German intel-
lectual community, like the French, underwent a strong reaction against
the heritage of 19th-century neo-Kantianism. Unlike in the case of the
French, however, that reaction resulted not in the adoption of an his-
toricism that would temper the traditionally anti-historical esprit de
géométrie of the French, but rather in the repudiation of a certain kind
of historicism. For in 19th-century Germany, neo-Kantianism had
acquired positivistic, relativist, and scientizing propensities that imbued
later critics, from Windelband, Rickert, and Dilthey to Husserl and
Heidegger, with a sense of ‘the crisis of historicism’. That crisis became,
during the Weimar period between the world wars, a crisis of German
national identity which Heidegger universalized by giving ontological
significance – by, in Nietzsche’s words, ‘projecting the conditions of
existence as predicates of being in general’.20 Whereas in France, to be
‘historical’ in a Marxian-Hegelian sense was to challenge, or at least
qualify, the epistemological dominance of the natural sciences, in
Germany to be ‘historical’ was to reinforce that dominance. The title of
Hans-Ulrich Lessing’s History as a Process of Conferring Meaning upon
the Meaningless (1919), published one year after Spengler’s The Decline
of the West, says it all, or at least helps to explain why Heidegger, in
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common with many of his generation after the First World War, felt so
strongly the need to recover another kind of history, one that he called
‘historicity’ and which would not be subject to the epistemological
stranglehold of the sciences. And for that purpose it was necessary to
re-think ‘the being’ of history, a re-thinking which, under the crisis-
driven conditions of the Weimar Republic, could be ratcheted up,
rhetorically, to ‘the destruction of the history of ontology’.21
In understanding and assessing the philosophical sources of post-
structuralism and postmodernism, then, two very different intellectual
contexts need to be taken into account: the Weimar period in Germany
between the two world wars; and the rise of structuralism in France
during the 1950s and 1960s. Both of these contexts received a strong
impetus from the thought of Heidegger. As Michael Roth said, ‘the
Heideggerian critique of humanism illuminates Hyppolite’s abandon-
ment of historicism. The path of his retreat would become well traveled
by the 1960s, and Heidegger was the guide.’22 Although Sartre had
drawn extensively on Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) to formulate
his early philosophy of existentialism, he had not hesitated to give that
work a humanistic reading quite different from Heidegger’s purposes.
Sartre’s perspective, in this regard, and his development of an emphati-
cally Marxist philosophy during the 1950s, as well as his willingness,
along with many other French intellectuals of this time, to overlook
or excuse Stalinist atrocities, must be understood against the backdrop
of a French culture that had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands
of Nazi Germany. Indeed, the primary reason that the moral authority
of the French Communist Party was so high after the war was that it
had been one of the few groups in France actively to resist Nazism
during the war, although only after Hitler’s invasion of Russia in
1941.23
Yet by the 1960s the situation had changed dramatically. Not only
had the second generation of French structuralists, especially Foucault
and Derrida, grown increasingly disenchanted with Marxism – Foucault
sarcastically described Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason, published
in 1960, as ‘the last great work of the 19th century’24 – but they also
exhibited increasing admiration for the philosophy of a man who had
been, for a short time, a member of the Nazi Party, and whose work,
more importantly, had been put in the service of Nazi ideology by
Heidegger himself. The question that cries out for an answer is: Why?
What was it in Heidegger’s work, especially in his late work, that so
strongly appealed to French thinkers of this period that they were willing
not just to break with the tradition of Cartesian and Enlightenment
rationalism to which Marxian, Hegelian, and phenomenological thinkers
such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty had, in spite of everything, remained
attached, but even to turn their backs on the virtually sacrosanct role of
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the French intellectual as spokesperson for the progressive and emanci-
patory values of western civilization?
III
The answer to this question, I submit, lies in that deep-seated onto-
logical, but emphatically anti-metaphysical, urge that has increasingly
driven humankind, since the 18th century, to redefine itself in linguistic
terms. In the first section of this essay, I contended that the most import-
ant sources of contemporary literary theory are neither the linguistics-
based movement of French structuralism, as the term ‘poststructuralism’
implies, nor a ‘modernity’ that has been superseded, as the term ‘post-
modernism’ implies, but rather a modernist tradition of aesthetics
shaped by 18th- and early 19th-century German Romanticism and
idealism. What characterizes this modernist tradition of aesthetics is its
valorization of language as a mode of being possessed of an ‘ontological’
status. I place the term ‘ontological’ in quotes in order to distinguish
between the ancient term ‘metaphysics’, with its Aristotelian and neo-
Platonic connotations of a ‘Chain of Being’, and the more modern term
‘ontology’, which was coined in the 17th-century by an obscure Calvin-
ist philosopher, and which became widely used during the 18th century
by Leibnizian philosophers Christian Wolff and Alexander Baumgarten;
the latter, not incidentally, also helped to establish modern usage of
the term ‘aesthetics’.25 ‘Metaphysics’ and ‘ontology’ have their roots,
respectively, in those two most major currents of our western heritage,
the Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian. These currents, although
inextricably linked to one another in innumerable ways, have nonethe-
less been engaged, as Nietzsche put it, ‘in a fearful struggle on earth for
thousands of years’.26 Classical metaphysics may be distinguished from
modern ontology by the former’s lack of a distinct concept of ‘existence’
as radically contingent.27 Usually set in opposition to the Aristotelian
and more rationalistic concept of ‘essence’, the notion of existence has
its sources in the distinctively Christian account of creation ex nihilo.
It was given special emphasis by Martin Luther during the Reformation
and gained currency in modern times through the work of Søren
Kierkegaard, which influenced Heidegger and other existentialist
thinkers.28 By providing a counter-concept to ‘presence’, it has also
influenced, less directly, poststructuralist and postmodernist thinkers.29
As I will use the terms in this paper, then, ‘metaphysics’ inherits the
rationalistic emphasis placed on being by classical culture; it asks of the
whatness or essences of things (ousia, essentia), such ‘essences’ forming
a conceptually comprehensible, eternally self-generating hierarchy, or
Chain of Being, in which the human essence occupies one, and not the
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highest, level. ‘Ontology’, on the other hand, signifies not metaphysics,
but what Kant called a ‘metaphysics of metaphysics’ (my emphasis). It
inherits the sense of radical contingency placed on being by Christian,
especially Lutheran, theology, asking of the thatness or ‘existence’ of
things (existentia), an existence not comprehensible in human terms but
whose mystery human being is uniquely qualified, by virtue of its
capacity for language, to engage with. Whereas classical metaphysics
declares, ex nihilo nihil fit (‘from nothing, nothing comes to be’), Chris-
tian thinkers such as Augustine maintain, ex nihilo fit – ens creatum
(‘from nothing comes created being’). Pre-Christian metaphysics asks,
‘What is?’ Post-Christian ontology wonders that there is anything at all
and poses the question, originating with Leibniz but taking on its dis-
tinctively modern implications with Hume, Schelling, and Heidegger,
‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’30
The latter question is distinctively modern because the mere asking
of it throws us into a ‘hermeneutic circle’ which is not only inescapable
but imposes on us a skeptical doubt about ‘the reality’ of what lies
outside us; it imposes a view of ourselves from within as stretched
between a dialectical, but at the same time a dialectically unresolvable,
tension of being and nothingness. That tension subsists on, and is con-
tinuously incited by, the threat of nihilism. Such a threat, as Karl Lowith
pointed out, could have arisen in radical form only in the context of the
Christian notion of creation ex nihilo, for only those who believe they
have been created out of nothing are likely to be haunted by the con-
tingency that they may become nothing once again. In ‘What is Meta-
physics?’, Heidegger acknowledges his indebtedness to the old formula
of Christian metaphysics, ex nihilo ens qua ens fit [‘from the nothing
all beings as beings come to be’].31 By contrast, the ancient Greeks and
Romans, with their assumption that the universe was uncreated and
eternally self-subsistent, were unaware of, or in any case indifferent to,
the radical threat of nihilism.32
Such ‘complacency of being’, although in tension with Christian
teachings from the beginning, received its most radical attack only with
Martin Luther’s campaign to ‘destroy’ Christian theology, a campaign
that directly influenced Heidegger’s project to ‘destroy the history of
ontology’.33 Luther’s campaign took aim at the central basis of the
classical, especially Aristotelian metaphysics inherited by Christianity:
its understanding of the cosmos as a perpetually self-generating text that
could be ‘read’ literally or allegorically from nature. Influenced by
William of Ockham’s nominalism, Luther viewed the ‘book of nature’
as essences ‘in name only’ and not, as in classical allegoresis, ‘real’. What
was ‘real’, rather, was a power of existence, a force of creation, ‘behind’
and wholly independent of the language in which external nature speaks
to us. Such ‘power of existence’ was attributed to the power God had
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exhibited in creating the universe as well as to the holy Scriptures that
were the direct expression of that creation.34 During the 16th and 17th
centuries, moreover, such power of existence became associated with
another sort of ‘creation’ also recounted in the Bible: Adam’s ability to
create language in accordance with his direct insight into the essential
natures of words. But it was not until the 18th-century debates on ‘the
origin of language’ engaged in by a host of English, French, and German
thinkers that Adam’s language-creating capacity gradually shed its
divine origin and became widely associated with a non-naturalistic,
reflective capacity, termed by Locke ‘reflection’, by Condillac ‘reflexion’,
and by Herder ‘Besonnenheit’, that was viewed as characteristic of
humankind in general. Whereas 17th-century thinkers had assumed that
the ‘essences’ of things pre-existed their expression in language, 18th-
century thinkers, led by Locke and Condillac, generally countered or at
least qualified this assumption by granting language a formative role in
the origin of the categories of rational thought.35
The feature that enabled language to take on such a formative role
was the arbitrary nature of signs. Such arbitrariness, as Jonathan Culler
observed, applies not just to the signifier, or sensory symbol; taken in
that limited sense, many pre-modern and classical thinkers also held to
‘the arbitrary nature of the sign’.36 What distinguishes modern accounts
is the contention that not just the signifier, but also the signified, or
meaning, is arbitrary. Language is no longer seen as reflecting a fixed
basis of being. Rather, it gives expression to a capacity that frees our
concepts and meanings from the static order of ‘mere’ nature and
attaches them to arbitrary signs whose operations reflect a non-natural,
distinctively human order of being. It is precisely that capacity which
we dignify ontologically by the term ‘existence’. Modern ontology, and
the valorization of language that characterizes it, thus differ from all
previous ontologies and systems of metaphysics in that they foster a
skepticism about the mimetic or representational properties of language
which simultaneously release into textual play human creative energies.
At issue is not the superficial skepticism that denies reason or imputes
an irrationality to human nature, but rather the form and shape reason
takes given the fact that our ‘essence’ is formed by language. When
Derrida, for example, makes the at first sight paradoxical claim that
‘writing’ (écriture) preceded speech, he is making an argument con-
tinuous with the debates on the origin of language during the 18th
century: that language is so important to the very ‘being’ of humankind
that it defines the nature of reason and must therefore be given logical
priority over it. Language, the act of language, precedes essence, to
adapt the Sartrean dictum. That is why Derrida’s notion of text must
be understood, in the words of Rodolphe Gasche, ‘as an attempt to
come to grips with the Heideggerian question of Being. What Derrida
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thus calls the text, instead of being governed by Being, makes Being a
function of the general text’.37 Gianni Vattimo, similarly, emphasizes
that Derrida’s notion of differance ‘is very far from signifying any
decline in or exhaustion of the idea of ontological difference put forward
by Heidegger’.38 Or Judith Butler, speaking of the rhetorical ‘violence’
so often effected by ‘excitable speech’, asks: ‘Could language injure us
if we were not, in some sense, linguistic beings, beings who require
language in order to be? Is our vulnerability to language a consequence
of our being constituted within its terms?’39
Such an understanding of language as a mode of being constitutes
what I call an ‘ontology of reflection’ in contrast to the ‘metaphysics of
presence’ that typified pre-modern, essentialist accounts of language.
My purpose in introducing this terminology is not just to reinforce the
distinction between ‘metaphysics’ and ‘ontology’, but to provide a con-
ceptual framework within which our understanding of the development
of modern aesthetics, and of the concept of language which informed
that development, can be related to the larger philosophical issues at
hand. It is not coincidental, in this regard, that it was the same philo-
sopher, Immanuel Kant, who wrote the single most influential critique
of classical metaphysics, The Critique of Pure Reason, and the single
most influential treatise of modern aesthetics, The Critique of Judgment.
The rise of modern aesthetics can be traced from Baumgarten’s work
and its antecedents in the 17th and 18th centuries through that of
Condillac, Diderot, Rousseau, Hamann, Herder, Humboldt to Kant;
and, from Kant to Schiller, Schelling, Hegel, and Coleridge – whose
work, along with that of Victor Cousin, Mme de Stael, and later Carlyle,
had such a decisive influence in this country, particularly on Poe and
Emerson, and later on New Critics. By distinguishing between a pre-
modern metaphysics of presence and a modern ontology of reflection,
I am suggesting, the rise of modern aesthetics gains a greater philo-
sophical coherence by being viewed against the backdrop of a radically
new idea of ‘reality’, one that did something that classical metaphysics,
the metaphysics of presence, had never done; it invested language with
ontological significance.
To emphasize this disjuncture, I will use the terms ‘metaphysics of
presence’ and ‘ontology of reflection’ in opposition to one another, even
though we should keep in mind that they are interdependent and that
in fact modern ontology carries with it many pre-modern, metaphysical
resonances while ancient metaphysics carries with it many modern,
ontological resonances. My use of the terms is adapted, of course, from
the writings of Heidegger and Derrida, and is consistent with many
aspects of their analyses, if not with their terminologies or, more funda-
mentally, with their philosophical approaches. Derrida, for example,
referring to his term ‘deconstruction’, remarks: 
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It was a kind of active translation that displaces somewhat the word
Heidegger uses: ‘Destruktion’, the destruction of ontology, which also does
not mean the annulment, the annihilation of ontology, but an analysis of
the structure of traditional ontology.40
In a note to ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, Derrida traces where such
a ‘non-annulment’ of, or overcoming of metaphysics from within, was
to lead Heidegger: 
After desiring to restore the properly ontological intention dormant within
metaphysics, after having reawakened the ‘fundamental ontology’ beneath
‘metaphysical ontology’, Heidegger, faced by the tenacity of traditional
ambiguity, finally proposes to abandon the terms ‘ontology’ and ‘onto-
logical’ (Introduction to Metaphysics). The question of Being cannot be
submitted to an ontology.41
Gilles Deleuze, similarly, distinguishes between traditional meta-
physics and modern ontology by associating the former with ‘essence’
and the latter with ‘sense’. Referring specifically to Jean Hyppolite’s
Heideggerian reading of Hegel in Logic and Existence, which also
strongly influenced Derrida, Deleuze says:
The external difference between reflection and being is the internal differ-
ence of Being itself, in other words, Being identical to difference, identical
to mediation. Being, according to Hyppolite, is not essence, but sense, it
refers to being not as the essence beyond the appearance, not as a second
world which would be the intelligible world, but as the sense of this world.
Kant, however, is still the one most responsible for the substitution, because
the critique replaces the being of the possible with the possibility of being;
in short, essence with sense. That there is no ‘beyond’ means that there is
no ‘beyond’ of the world and that in the world there is no ‘beyond’ of
thought (because being thinks itself in thought). Finally, it means that in
thought itself there is nothing beyond language.42
What both Derrida and Deleuze are getting at, in the above passages,
is something very much like Kant’s use of the phrase ‘the metaphysics of
metaphysics’, to connote a new form of ontology. Nonetheless, neither
Derrida nor Deleuze distinguishes consistently between ‘metaphysics’
and ‘ontology’ in the way I am proposing, but on the contrary they often
use the terms synonomously to refer to an understanding of Being, and
of the language in which Being has been forgotten, that is characteristic
not just of classical but of modern times as well. Unlike Schelling, as
Peter Dews has argued, ‘deconstruction often prefers to forget that the
linguistic character of being also implies the ontological character of
language’.43 By providing what, in my terminology, is an ‘ontological’
critique of ‘metaphysics’, yet at the same time conflating the two terms,
Heidegger and Derrida are enabled to have it both ways; they can provide
a radical critique of western metaphysics without giving their own
199
McDonald: Language and being
03 PSC 041243 (bc/s)  8/4/04  10:01 am  Page 199
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016psc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
positions a positive content that would make them vulnerable to counter-
critiques. The results, without doubt, have been polemically effective. But
they have also had the effect of obscuring understanding of the central
philosophical ‘event’ of our time: the emergence of language as a form
of being. They have obscured such understanding by conflating modern
and pre-modern understandings of language: by projecting what is
basically a Romanticist critique of Enlightenment values and thought
onto a totalizing account of the history of western thought since Plato.44
By contrast, I maintain, in general agreement with Nietzsche, that in the
centuries-old conflict between the metaphysics of presence and the
ontology of reflection, a decisive although perhaps not final victory was
gained in the 18th century for the latter, and that the works of Heidegger
and Derrida, as well as those of most modern philosophers, including
Nietzsche’s, are heir, willingly or not, to this victory.
Poststructuralist and postmodernist thinkers, for all the sophisti-
cation of their semiotic account of language, have failed to grasp the
significance of their own ‘linguistic turn’.45 For what this phrase is some-
times taken to imply is that language and being are somehow at odds
with one another, as though language represented a sphere or dimen-
sion beyond being or ‘irreal’. But the shift that was set into motion by
the Reformation and which reached maturity, though not finality, in
Romanticism was a linguistic turn only in a secondary sense; more
fundamentally, it was an ontological turn in which a metaphysics of
presence based on rational essences gave way to an ontology of reflec-
tion based on contingent being. Such a turn was the product of a certain
historical development, and in no sense the source of that historical
development, as Heidegger maintained.46
IV
Among the factors obscuring our understanding of the emergence of
language as a form of being – of the displacement of homo sapiens by
homo textilis – is a conceptual polarization which, although certainly
not invented by contemporary literary theorists, has been perpetuated
by them: the polarization between the Enlightenment and Romanticism.
As scholars have long argued, the developments of German Romanti-
cism and idealism were strongly influenced by the English and French
‘Enlightenments’ through their roles, among others, in challenging
classical conceptions of language. In disparaging Enlightenment thought
and privileging, at least implicitly, Romantic thought, contemporary
theorists not only underestimate and undervalue our debt to Enlighten-
ment thinkers, but misunderstand and oversimplify the nature of
Romanticism itself.47
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The sources of such misunderstanding may be deemed ‘ideological’,
in the sense in which Jerome McGann has applied this term to an earlier
generation of scholars in The Romantic Ideology. That generation privi-
leged ‘unity of being’ and ‘harmony of differences’ as definitive of the
nature of Romanticism.48 Yet, as McGann argued, if romantic thinkers
were influenced by pre-modern, as well as by 16th- and 17th-century
organicist views of language, that influence was by no means hegem-
onic and was in any case, I would add, complemented by the more
general influence of natural law and social contract theory. The latter
treated social phenomena, including language, not just as ‘artificial’ con-
structs but as the products of an autonomous ‘second nature’, or human
reflective capacity, that appealed to aesthetic experience and modeled
itself on the example of verbal language, especially poetry. Indeed, the
concept of the Aufhebung was applied to aesthetics long before it
became the leading concept of German idealism in Hegel’s philosophy;
it plays a significant role, for example, in Kant’s exposition of the
‘dynamically sublime’ in the Critique of Judgment (106, 121).49
Contemporary critics and theorists who describe ‘disunity of being’
and ‘non-resolution of difference’ as characteristically anti-Romanticist
oversimplify the complexity of these concepts and betray an ideological
bias no less pronounced than that of earlier generations, for such
‘disunity’ and ‘non-resolution’ are clearly extensions of a dialectical
mode of thinking that originated with Romanticism; they are expressions
of what Tzvetan Todorov calls a ‘romantic spirit that enthrones differ-
ence in the place of identity’.50 Could it be that even in the 21st century
we have not left behind entirely that ‘other’ age, the Age of Romanti-
cism – not to mention, the age of modernism? Jean-François Lyotard
hints as much in The Postmodern Condition; and Philippe Lacoue-
LaBarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, two thinkers closely associated with
Derrida, make the case emphatically in The Literary Absolute. Certainly
there are few major themes of modernism and postmodernism that were
not explicitly anticipated by Romanticist and idealist thinkers.51
What needs to replace the very broad and over-simplifying distinc-
tion between the ‘Enlightenment’ and ‘Romanticism’ is a more complex
and nuanced set of distinctions, or rather entanglements, between
French, German, English, and American traditions of thought. Chief
among such entanglements, for the purposes here, is that between the
French and German traditions, traditions which have become closely
linked to one another by the very extremity of their differences. As
observers of the French scene have long noted, the history of French
philosophy since the early 19th century has largely been the history of
its use of German sources.52 Poet Heinrich Heine, who studied with
Hegel and who, in common with an admirer of Heine, Nietzsche, was
a francophile who detested much of German culture, put it this way in
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1831: ‘great France has never been a fitting abode for philosophy, which
perhaps will never flourish on French soil’.53 Heine’s point was that the
French have drawn so heavily on German philosophy not, of course,
because they are themselves lacking in intellectual sophistication, but
because such sophistication is of a very different kind from that of the
Germans. As Lewis White Beck showed in his classic Early German
Philosophy, the impact of the natural sciences was felt much later in
Germany than in France and England.54 As a consequence, Germany’s
response to that impact, from Kant’s three Critiques to Hegel’s philo-
sophy of history to Heidegger’s ‘destruction of the history of ontology’,
was more systematic and considered. During the period from 1770 to
1840 especially, the Germans served as what H. Stuart Hughes called
‘the [philosophical] schoolmasters of Europe’.55 They served, most
especially, as developers and systematizers of a modern philosophy of
aesthetics that rejected the classical, ultimately Aristotelian theory of
artistic mimesis and defined its subject-matter as quite distinct from,
even opposed to, those of moral philosophy and epistemology. Here, as
so often is the case, Kant is the crucial figure. Just as in his first two
Critiques Kant separated morals from the theory of knowledge in order
to grant the former its own distinctive kind of knowledge in its own
separate sphere, so too in the Critique of Judgment Kant separated aes-
thetics from morals in order to grant the former its own autonomous
basis.56 Yet the arguments given for such autonomy were by no means
original to Kant or even to German philosophy in general; many of their
essential features had been anticipated by a long line of English, French,
and Italian thinkers of the 17th and especially 18th centuries. The vital
role that German thought played in the development of modern aes-
thetics consisted less in the originality of its contributions than in its
genius for systematizing and rationalizing a province of human experi-
ence that had more commonly been treated prior to the late 18th century
as incapable of systematization and rationalization. During the 16th
century, Martin Luther had advanced a ‘double-truth’ doctrine that
opposed reason and faith not as knowledge and belief but as two
different forms of knowledge; the basis of such a doctrine, as Frederick
Beiser showed, was not ‘irrationalist’ but on the contrary served as a
crucial source of the rationalist movements of the English Enlighten-
ment during the 17th century.57 The same is true of the development of
modern aesthetics during the 18th century, a development made possible
by an understanding of aesthetic experience not as ‘non-rational’ but as
constituting its own kind of reason, or what Baumgarten called ‘sensate
cognition’. For example, the importance and appeal of Coleridge’s
notion of ‘the suspension of disbelief’, which was directly influenced by
the work of Kant, Schelling, and Schiller, is that it gave expression to
this new ontological, non-metaphysical conception of aesthetics; and
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hence laid the ground for the preoccupation with language that has
characterized much of modernity since the 18th century.
Writing in 1831, Heine prophesied darkly a ‘German revolution’
that would complement the French revolutions of 1789 and 1830, and
which would ‘concern the whole human race’.58 Heine’s prophecy was
realized with consequences more grim than he, or Nietzsche, predicted,
during the Weimar era and afterward when many of Germany’s leading
intellectuals, or ‘mandarins’, in Fritz Ringer’s apt term, capitulated to
the forces of the ‘New Romanticism’ and the ‘conservative revolution’
that was effected in its most extreme form by the Nazis.59 Among those
intellectuals, was, of course, Martin Heidegger, arguably the 20th
century’s most influential philosopher, who was himself quite cognizant
of the influence of his own work on the French. As he said, in an inter-
view with Der Spiegel, ‘When [the French] begin to think, they speak
German; they say definitely that they would not manage it in their
language’.60
There is, perhaps, some limited amount of truth in what Heidegger
says here, but it gives a very distorted picture of the relation between
French and German cultures if it is not also emphasized that 18th-
century German Romanticism and idealism were fed by the very French
and English sources they were reacting against. Indeed, it might even be
said that contemporary ‘anti-humanism’, which has its sources in
Heidegger’s 1947 essay, ‘Letter on Humanism’, is indebted to the tra-
dition of ‘humanism’ – to the Renaissance tradition, that is, of studia
humanitatis, which denoted, according to Paul Oskar Kristeller, neither
‘a philosopical tendency’ nor ‘a system’, but rather a type of ‘literary’
and ‘rhetorical’ study ‘as old as the Greek Sophists’.61 It follows that in
recognizing the Romanticist sources of our current view of language we
also draw on and adapt, rather than simply dismiss, the rationalist and
humanist elements of that Romanticism.62 We must appreciate critically
the tradition of German idealism and Romanticism to which Heidegger
and Derrida owe so much and at the same time find within that tra-
dition a countervailing rationalism and humanism to which these
philosophers, along with many contemporary literary theorists in this
country, have failed to do justice.
My chief illustrations of the value of pursuing such a strategy, which
I can do little more than mention here, are the mature philosophies of
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, philosophies which, like those of Heidegger
and Derrida, must be understood as arising within the analytic-
continental divide and not at either one of its poles. Both Nietzsche and
Wittgenstein absorbed elements of the British philosophical tradition
through their common debt to the work of Arnold Schopenhauer, that
most ‘analytical’ of German philosophers; and both, even more import-
antly, wrote first books that exhibited philosophical tendencies and
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concerns similar to those of Heidegger and Derrida, but reacted sharply
against those tendencies in their later writings. The early works,
Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, were strongly influenced by Schopenhauer’s anti-Hegelian,
Kantian-based effort to ‘sublime’ art, especially music, by granting it a
status out of reach of ordinary reason. By contrast, their later writings,
including the 1886 preface to The Birth of Tragedy and the Philo-
sophical Investigations, reject their own earlier ‘absolutizing’ tenden-
cies, which Wittgenstein termed a need ‘to sublime the logic of language’
(89, 94) and Nietzsche a desire for ‘otherworldly comfort’.63
Such similarities and differences between the two pairs of thinkers
provide not just a basis of comparison, but also grounds for ‘confron-
tation’. In particular, Heidegger’s distorted reading of Nietzsche in
lectures delivered from 1936 to 1940, but not published until 1961,
which are the implicit and in some cases explicit basis of poststruc-
turalist and postmodernist readings of Nietzsche,64 must be supplanted
by a ‘Nietzsche’ very much at odds with Heidegger, a Nietzsche who
sharply reacted against his Lutheran heritage and who was at home, as
Heidegger was not, with the anti-Romanticist and anti-Christian values
of classical Rome and the Enlightenment.
A similar kind of confrontation, somewhat less antagonistic but still
significant, provides the context for a comparison of the thought of
Derrida and Wittgenstein, the important point of difference being
Wittgenstein’s ‘analytic’ habit of imaging language as spoken rather than
textual. Richard Rorty has argued that the early Wittgenstein, the
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, is relatively close in philosophical
perspective to the late Heidegger, but that Wittgenstein’s late writings
diverge sharply from the latter.65 It seems to me that this is exactly right
and that a parallel argument can be made about the relation between
Nietzsche and Heidegger. It is Nietzsche and Wittgenstein’s naturalistic
and ethically based accounts of language as a finite, ‘spatial and
temporal phenomenon’, in Wittgenstein’s phrase,66 that make their
works alternatives to – and not, as they are often misjudged to be,
supports for – the sterility and formalism of poststructuralist and post-
modernist anti-humanism.
V
During Heidegger’s debate in Davos, Switzerland, with neo-Kantian
philosopher Ernst Cassirer, a debate which took place in 1929, shortly
before Heidegger was to join the Nazi Party and Cassirer to be exiled
from Germany, a member of the audience asked: ‘Since both men
[Heidegger and Cassirer] speak a completely different language, could
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not an attempt at translation be made by both?’ Cassirer’s response to
this request was long and painstaking. Heidegger, however, replied as
follows: ‘I believe that what I describe by Dasein does not allow trans-
lation into a concept of Cassirer’s.’67 Karl Lowith, who studied with
Heidegger, identified the source of such intolerance as follows.
The basis that serves as the background for everything said by
Heidegger, and that permits many to take notice and listen attentively,
is something unsaid: the religious motive, which has surely detached
itself from Christian faith, but which precisely on account of its dog-
matically unattached indeterminancy appeals all the more to those who
are no longer faithful Christians but who nonetheless would like to be
religious.68
It is the weight of the ‘unsaid’ which, in Heidegger, provides the
ballast and deep persuasiveness of everything which is merely voiced or
articulated: the unfathomableness and infinite resonances silently set
into motion by that Question of Being whose whole point, or raison
d’être, is that it cannot be answered. Yet that unfathomableness, that
mystery, as it takes shape and is developed by Derrida – who, in this
sense, is Heidegger’s true and authentic disciple – is attached not to
the unarticulated, non-verbal realm of action and experience, as was the
case with traditional forms of mysticism. Rather, it is attached to
the text, to the written word, above all to the idea of textuality which,
through the genius of deconstruction, is made to resonate with all the
indeterminateness and undecideability that had attached to the merely
unspoken. Its model is the valorization of the Bible by Luther, which
initiated a distinctively German tradition whose essential features are
described by Nietzsche: 
How little German style has to do with sound and the ears is shown by
the fact that precisely our good musicians write badly. The German does
not read aloud, not for the ear but only with the eye; meanwhile his ears
are put away in a drawer. In antiquity men read – when they did read,
which happened rarely enough – to themselves, aloud, with a resounding
voice; one was surprised when anyone read quietly, and secretly asked
oneself for the reasons. With a resounding voice: that means, with all the
crescendos, inflections, and reversals of tone and changes in tempo in which
the ancient public took delight. In Germany the preacher alone knew what
a syllable weighs, or a word, and how a sentence strikes, leaps, plunges,
runs, runs out; he alone had a conscience in his ears, often enough a bad
conscience; for there is no lack of reasons why Germans rarely attain pro-
ficiency in rhetoric, and almost always too late.69
Nietzsche’s comments are illuminating when one considers that it
was in Germany that the academic lecture attained its highest develop-
ment; for the ‘lecture’ was precisely that form designed to subordinate
the spoken word to the written text. As Peter Szondi commented:
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Even in Hegel’s time lectures were still based on one’s own or someone
else’s compendium. The purpose of lectures was not to transmit knowledge
– that function was and is performed incomparably better by books. Rather
they were designed for the elucidation and discussion of a text that lay
before everyone in the audience.70
In his valuable book, Jeffrey Herf, consistently with Theodor Adorno
and Pierre Bourdieu’s earlier critiques of Heidegger, situates Heidegger’s
thought within the context of what he calls ‘reactionary modernism’,
which he defines as a rejection of Enlightenment reason together with
an acceptance of certain effects of modernity (technology) and the har-
nessing of such effects to anti-Enlightenment, irrationalist purposes.71
Viewed from a Nietzschean perspective, we might add that such a para-
doxical enterprise is motivated at bottom by a slave-moralistic effort to
reconstitute existence in the form of an ‘other’ metaphysics, or ontology
of existence, that culminates in the investment of language with a sort
of sacred status. What is provided in the process is ontological asssur-
ance, ‘metaphysical comfort’ (in Nietzsche’s phrase), together with
epistemological aggression. The two facets, ontological asssurance and
epistemological aggression, are most deeply characteristic of Heideg-
gerian thought. Together, they enable us to understand Heidegger’s
appeal to poststructuralist and postmodernist theory: its uncanny
combination of Romanticism and skepticism, a combination whose
antecedents can be clearly traced to the German reaction against the
Enlightenment: its employment of a radical skepticism (Hume, Spinoza)
in the service of romantic, other-worldly ideals (Hamann, Jacobi).
Derrida, of course, cannot in any way be associated with Nazism
or fascism. Nonetheless, his lengthy ‘deconstruction’ of Heidegger, Of
Spirit, in which he places Heidegger’s active and substantively philo-
sophical involvement with Nazism on the same level as the misuse – and
Derrida agrees that it was a misuse – of Nietzsche’s writings by the
Nazis, signifies a failure of ethical and political responsibility, if not,
indeed, a lapse of intellectual integrity, that has not failed to disturb
other French intellectuals such as Jean-François Lyotard, who describes
the latter failure as a product of ‘the deconstructive anamnesis, the blind
blank zone’. Alluding to Heidegger’s ‘silence’ on the Holocaust, and
Derrida’s discussion of that silence in Of Spirit, Lyotard speaks with a
ferocity of sarcasm and moral indignation that are conspicuous by their
absence in the public discourse of American literary theorists: 
Such is the gesture of deconstruction that it impedes or mesmerizes itself.
Freed of its onto-theological trappings (and of ethics, which is then only one
of its aspects), this question ‘finally’ gives and poses itself with Heidegger,
as it had been posing itself from the beginning, as he says. And this ‘finally’,
adds Derrida, is without end. ‘Posing’ the question correctly consists in
detecting in the metaphysical text, and even in the existential-ontological
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one, the signs, the slightest signs, of the lack of Being, which are the signs
that Being makes. One deconstructs, then, because everything is badly con-
structed. Instead of analyzing the great, inauthentic, blind constructions,
one sifts through and disperses the frail ruins through which Being (that
is, nothingness) can, for a moment, introduce its dying light. When this
meticulous and admirable archaeologist comes across the ashes of the
Holocaust, how could he be surprised? Has he not always known that
the ‘spirit’ of metaphysics builds its edifices on the denial of Being, on its
Verneinung, and that they are promised to the Vernichtung, the annihila-
tion, to the ashes by the retreat of Being? Only this one piece of bad news
might disturb him, namely, that the master-deconstructor, the foreman of
the post-philosophical excavation, has lent to extermination not his hand
and not even his thought but his silence and nonthought. That he ‘forgot’
the extermination.72
Lyotard’s reaction, in Heidegger and the Problem of the Jews, from
which the above quote is taken, to the revelations of Heidegger’s Nazism
renewed during the 1980s, when the movement of French structuralism
had lost most of its strength, was indeed more typical of the rhetorical
violence with which many French intellectuals reacted during this period
than was Derrida’s tepid response in Of Spirit. But what is even more
striking is that in the United States, where the movement of poststruc-
turalism never really died but was transmuted into postmodernism and
cultural studies, it has been Derrida’s lead, rather than Lyotard’s, which
has for the most part been followed. This may account for why there is
still such reluctance, among critics in the United States, to acknowledge
that Heideggerian philosophy has substantive links to the crisis of his-
toricism which preoccupied Weimar Germany and which led many of its
leading intellectuals to capitulate to fascism. And if Heideggerian philo-
sophy is implicated in this way, then so too are many currents of post-
structuralism and postmodernism – not necessarily politically, but
philosophically, intellectually, ethically. It is a complicity from which very
few of us can claim to be excluded – and certainly not someone drawing
on the thought of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, thought which has a
kinship, however uncomfortable, with that of Heidegger and Derrida.
In his portrait of the Apostle Plotinus Plinlimmon in Pierre, Herman
Melville satirizes a certain tendency of American culture applicable as
well to modern literary theorists. Plinlimmon’s philosophy revolves
around a contrast between our imperfect worldly ‘horological’ time and
the ideal ‘chronometric’ time of heaven – in Kantian terms, between
phenomenal and noumenal spheres. But the crucial feature of the logic
of these two spheres is that precisely because they are so absolutely con-
tradictory they are absolutely consistent with one another: ‘By their very
contradictions they are made to correspond’. Melville identifies here a
kind of logic that may be seen as the culmination of the historical
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development from allegoresis to modern symbolism, in which a dualism
constrained by the hierarchical metaphysics of the chain of being gives
way to a more radical dualism characteristic of modern ontology’s binary
opposition between existence and non-existence, being and nothingness.
Whereas it is crucial to pre-modern dualisms such as that of Augustine’s
kingdom of heaven versus kingdom of earth to sustain an unresolvable
tension between the terms of the duality – between, for example, ideal
and reality – the modern ontology of existence radicalizes the opposi-
tionality between such terms by evacuating their content and context, in
the process eliminating any hierarchical, graded links between the terms
of the duality such that they may collapse in upon themselves and be
rendered dialectically equivalent: ‘by their very contradictions they are
made to correspond’.73 Melville pinpoints here the ‘genius’ of American
culture: its ability to fuse or ‘aufheben’ the contradictions between ideal
and reality, between what it believes and what it does, in the very process
of intensifying them. As in the case of Nietzschean slave morality, it is
crucial to this logic that the act of negation be prior to that of affir-
mation: that ‘all the terms be negative’ and that the ideal define itself
through its antithesis. As Sacvan Bercovitch has described this logic:
Symbolic analysis confines us to the alternatives generated by the symbol
itself. It may suggest unexpected meanings, but only within a fixed bipolar
system. Since every symbol unites opposites, or represents them as the same
thing, we can understand what is being represented only by measuring it
against its opposite, or by placing it within a series of comparable and
related oppositions. Thus the search for meaning is at once endless and
self-enclosed. Any possibility we propose invites a host of different possi-
bilities, all of these inherent in the symbol. Any resolution of opposites we
discover is implicit in the dualisms with which we began.74
Bercovitch describes here a kind of thinking that he sees as charac-
teristic of American culture from the 17th-century Puritans, with their
equation of heaven and earth, promise and fulfillment, in the form of
God’s new chosen people, to Jonathan Edwards’s post-millennialist
reconciliation of historical and sacred time (as reflected in Lockean
empiricism and Calvinistic other-worldliness, respectively), to Emerson’s
pragmatist resolution of Jacksonian America’s cultural chauvinism and
Swedenborgian transcendentalism. But he could just as well be talking
about American critics’ uses of Derridean deconstruction, in which the
most abstract, other-worldly notion of ‘theory’, one based on an anti-
humanistic and de-naturalized view of the workings of language, is con-
joined to the most ‘this-worldly’ social and political goals. What impels
such theory is the urge to ontologize; and what masks the nature of that
urge is a radical epistemological skepticism which claims to affirm, or
‘decide’, nothing. But to affirm nothing, a genuinely performative ethics
demands, is to affirm Nothing. It is to let in ontology through the back
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door, all the while barring the front door to any finitely grounded,
culturally specific, evaluative criticism.
Here care must be taken to avoid the fallacy of assuming that
Derrida’s work is representative of the second generation of French
structuralists. It is true that his work articulates with the highest degree
of philosophical self-consciousness the Heideggerian sources of his
generation’s perspective – more so, for example, than the works of
Foucault and Lacan, not to mention those of Deleuze and Lyotard.75
But the impression needs to be sharply qualified: to be put, in Heideg-
gerian terms, ‘under erasure’. For to the extent that it is true, it is true
from the perspective of literary theorists in this country, and even from
that perspective, only to a limited extent. It is not true in any sense from
a French perspective. On the contrary, although Derrida has been for
almost 30 years the single greatest philosophical influence on literary
theory in the United States, he has been neither an especially influential
nor representative figure within his own country. It would appear that
what does not appeal entirely to French intellectuals about Derrida’s
work does appeal quite hugely to American literary theorists: his ability
to incorporate a Romanticist, Germanic habit of thought within an
intensely analytical, French practice of language. In Negative Dialectics,
Theodor Adorno characterized Heideggerian philosophy as ‘a second
reprise of the old philosophies of the Absolute, their first reprise having
been post-Kantian idealism’.76 Could it be that American poststruc-
turalism and postmodernism, if not a third reprise, are nonetheless
haunted by the ghost of such an Absolute? Is it possible that Derrida’s
influence in this country is an indication less of the ability of American
critics to assimilate French styles of thinking and writing than of a char-
acteristically American resistance to such styles?
Literary theorists in this country, by endorsing Heidegger and
Derrida’s self-serving accounts of their writings as assaults on the entire
history of western philosophy, and by failing to judge them critically as
outgrowths of that history, have not only obscured the sources from
which an understanding of language as a concrete social and cultural
form of action can be recovered. They have also helped to sustain the
central tenet of American literary theory since the 1960s: that there is
such a thing as a ‘western philosophical tradition’ that we may
maneuver ourselves, through an endless series of linguistic coinages and
‘erasures’, on the ‘other’ side of. My claim is that to the extent that there
is such an other side, we are already on it, and that we fundamentally
misunderstand our situation if we regard it as ‘other’ to the western
philosophical tradition.
English Department, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA
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Notes
1 There are, of course, many references to the oddity of literary critics’ use of
the term ‘theory’. For example, in Ferdinand de Saussure (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1986), Jonathan Culler remarks on ‘that strange
realm called “theory” ’ (p. 10). But there is to my knowledge no extended,
substantive discussion of the displacement of the term ‘philosophy’ by
‘theory’ by American literary theorists as it has taken shape in recent
decades. In contrast, François Dosse, in his comprehensive history of French
structuralism, History of Structuralism, 2 vols, trans. Deborah Glassman
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), emphasizes just this
point in his discussion of the tension in France between philosophy and the
social sciences: ‘By renewing its problematic, philosophy could socialize the
social sciences, which had the advantage of using a readable, rigorous, and
formalizable discourse. The operation was so successful that philosophers
refrained from carrying it out in the name of philosophy, which many
at the time considered dead; instead, they substituted the word theory’
(pp. 297–98). See also pp. 259, 330–32.
2 In ‘Signature Event Context’, trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman, in
Limited Inc. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), Derrida
identified ‘the system of interpretation’ he was critiquing with ‘the history
of philosophy’, asserting that he did not ‘believe that a single counter-
example [to such system of interpretation] can be found in the entire history
of philosophy as such’ (p. 3). In the preface to Of Grammatology, Derrida
notes that his assertions in the following pages ‘demand that reading should
free itself, at least in its axis, from the classical categories of history – not
only from the categories of the history of ideas and the history of literature
but also, and perhaps above all, from the categories of the history of philo-
sophy’ (p. lxxxix); Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). In Dissemination,
trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981),
Derrida goes so far as to link together Plato, Rousseau and Saussure in one,
all-unifying proper name, in order to signify a common adherence to a
metaphysics of presence: ‘Plato-Rousseau-Saussure’ (p. 110).
3 The New Critics were influenced by Benedetto Croce’s Aesthetic: A Science
of Expression, trans. Douglas Ainslie (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 1909), which demarcates aesthetic intuition from the categories
of ‘the true and the good’. See also his Guide to Aesthetics, trans. Patrick
Romanell (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1965), p. xxvii, as well as W. K.
Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks’s Literary Criticism: A Short History (New
York: Random House, 1957); Monroe C. Beardsley’s Aesthetics: From
Classical Greece to the Present (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
1966); Walter Jackson Bate’s Criticism: The Major Texts (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970) and Vincent Leitch’s American Literary
Criticism: From the 30s to the 80s (New York: Columbia University Press,
1988).
4 ‘What Americans call poststructuralism existed even before the structural
paradigm waned. In fact, it was contemporary with its triumph’: Dosse,
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History, II, p. 17. See also Sunil Khilani, Arguing Revolution: The Intellec-
tual Left in Postwar France (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993)
and Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992). In Deconstructive Criticism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1983), Vincent Leitch comments,
‘American deconstructors largely bypass examinations of structuralism
(and of its “sign”) since it never really established a significant foothold in
America’ (pp. 100–1). In Cultural Criticism, Literary Theory, Poststruc-
turalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), Leitch notes: ‘Given
its commitments, poststructuralist cultural criticism is suspicious of literary
formalism’ (p. 9). Such a perspective contrasts strikingly with Derrida’s
who, criticizing Saussure in Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1981), asserts, ‘The theme of the arbitrary,
thus, is turned away from its most fruitful paths (formalization) toward a
hierarchizing teleology’ (p. 21). On the misconceptions surrounding the
politics of New Criticism, see Morris Dickstein, ‘Ralph Ellison, Race, and
American Culture’, Raritan: A Quarterly Review (Spring, 1999): 30–50.
5 In The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanti-
cism, trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1988), Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy,
two authors closely associated with Derrida, comment on the collaboration
of German romantics on their journal, the Athenaeum, as follows: ‘At no
point does one discern the least departure from this nearly two-hundred-
year-old form on the part of what calls itself “avant-garde” today. The
Athenaeum is our birthplace’ (p. 8); see also pp. 9–12, 29, 34–5, 105–8,
124. See, too, Peter Dews, Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist
Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory (London: Verso, 1987),
pp. 19–25, 115–50; Gillian Rose, ‘Of Derrida’s Spirit’, in David Wood (ed.),
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Political Philosophy, Vol. II, trans. Franklin Philip (Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 1–74. See also note 51.
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Dosse, History, I, pp. 59–70, 166–87. On the breakthroughs it achieved
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trans. L. Scott-Fox and J. M. Harding (Cambridge: Cambridge University
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(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1975), pp. 1–30.
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trans. Katrine Picher Keuneman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
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John Richard von Sturmer and Rodney Needham (Boston, MA: Beacon
Press, 1969), pp. 108–9. On Sartre’s role in general in relation to struc-
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pp. 19–65, 138–41; Vattimo, Adventure, pp. 30–5, 159–80; Simon
Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (West
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1992), pp. 1–29. On the influence
of Husserlian phenomenology, see Descombes, Modern French Philosophy,
pp. 3–4, 140–6; Critchley, Ethics, pp. 54–5, 64–5; Dews, Logics, pp. 5–15.
13 On the revolt against neo-Kantianism and return to Hegel, see Mark Poster,
Existential Marxism in Postwar France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1975), pp. 3–71; Stuart H. Hughes, Between Commitment and Dis-
illusion: The Obstructed Path and the Sea Change, 1930–1965 (Middle-
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Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe, vol. II (Frankfurt am Main:
V. Klostermann, 1977), p. 518. On Germany’s traditional lack of political
avenues of expression, see M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern, Nietzsche on Tragedy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 299. On Germany’s
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mann, 1975), p. 16, Heidegger says, ‘It can be shown historically that at
bottom all the great philosophies since antiquity more or less explicitly took
themselves to be, and as such sought to be, ontology’ (p. 12). As for Derrida,
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